Svensk Militärhistoria / Swedish Military History

Georg Henrik Jägerhorns view on some episodes during the war of King Gustav III in 1788-1790.

The 1790 campaign in Savolax and southern Finland

The Swedish attack on Parda- and Kärnäkoski (15 April)

Jägerhorn explain the reason for the successful operation

The Russian counter attack and the defence at Parda-and Käräkoski (30 April)

The Russian attack on Pirtimäki (5 May)

The battle at the Keltis barracks (19-20 May)

The expedition towards Savitaipal (4 June)

Go back to the campaign of 1788

Go back to the campaign of 1789

 (Source: G H Jägerhorn i fält för Gustav III, Petra och Pertti Hakala, Helsingfors and Stockholm 2004 and the Finska arméens och Finlands krigshistoria, Julius Mankell, Stockholm 1870)

The Swedish attack on Parda- and Kärnäkoski (15 april)

In October 1789 the fighting's came to an end and the troops on both sides were sent to winter quarters. Lieutenant colonel Jägerhorn has now been given appointed to commander of the St Michel sector and due to that appointment he was encouraged by the king to write a proposal for the 1790 campaign. Already in October the plan was delivered to the king and eventually it was approved. So, what kind of plan was it? Was it a plan for operations in his own sector or does it hold a wider perspective? Jägerhorn does not reveal this.

It is likely that the King already had realised that that the war could not be won by a land offensive, so instead the ambitious 1788 plan of an naval operation against St Petersburg is reviewed and rewritten. 

The new naval plan was to be launched in may, but to draw the Russian attention away from the sea, minor offensives in Carelia and Savolax has to be launched. The king was expected to supervise these operations in person, but he was delayed for so long that the rather ambitious plans had to be adjusted.

According to Jägerhorns initial plan, the campaign was to be initiated in the shift from February to Mars by a royal led offensive from Savolax towards Villmanstrand. The preparations are however so slow that Jägerhorn seeks the king and complain in person. On the 1st of January Jägerhorn is granted all the authorities he require in order to prepare for the campaign. And finally, all the supply and all the troops are ready, but were is the king?

The king has been delayed in Stockholm by "Matters and correspondences with foreign powers". These are likely concerning how the European courts are to deal with the resent events in France, later known as the French revolution. But it is also known that the king is working hard on an alliance with Prussia in the current war on Russia.

Finally the king shows up in St Michel but he is more then six weeks late and the possibilities to execute Jägerhorns plan has literally melted away with the snow. The poor Finnish roads are by now turning into mud, preventing all major military operations. Jägerhorn has to spend a lot of energy in explaining for the king and his military advisor general major Armfelt that the whole enterprise was now impossible.

Since they have spent so much energy to gather troops and supply in St Michel, he king feel that they still has to execute some activities so general major Armfelt is instructed to work something out. However the king rejects Armfelts plan and instead Jägerhorn, who is familiar with the area, is instructed to plan something.

The plan Jägerhorn presents aim to take control of the key passages at Parda- and Kärnäkoski. The benefit is the possession of a strong defensive position, much better then what the Swedes currently hold in St Michel. The second benefit is that it would probably draw Russian forces away from the Kymmene river, and that fit well into the bigger plan for the up coming campaign. The roads was now unusable for transportations but the ices on the big lakes was still strong, so, that's what Jägerhorn intends to use.

The avant-garde is formed by 300 men from the Dalarnas vargering, 180 men from Helsinge vargering, 240 men from the Jönköping regiment and 20 Savolax jaegers. As the Russian force is estimated to be roughly of the same size as the Swedes, success depends on speed and surprise. The force is divided into three battalions and each platoon receive horse drawn sledges.

By 11 am on the 15th of April the Swedes sets out on the ices. Through careful reconnaissance the Swedes know that the Russians has Cossacks posted roughly 10 km from their main camp in Pardakoski. When the Swedes reaches the outposts they can see the mounted messengers riding back to alert the camp. This is just as Jägerhorn has expected and this is when they make use for the sledges. Up to this point the Swedish troops have advanced on foot but now they mount the sledges and drive as fast as they can towards the Russian camp. Thanks to the sledges, the Swedes can arrive at Pardakoski before any defence can be organized. Only a small unit manages to take up a defence at Kärnäkoski but they are rapidly driven away by the Dalarnas vargering. Simultaneously, the battalion from Jönköping drives off 200 Russians from Kuivasari, right north from Pardakoski. This action is not done with the same surprise and speed as the rest of the operation so the Russians can retreat in good order.

Within just a few hours the Swedes has completed the operation and secured the passes. Their losses has been small, only 6 dead and 18 wounded. Jägerhorn has no knowledge of of the Russian losses but claims that they must have been considerable. The Swedes take 39 prisoners, 2 fully equipped cannons, two supply depots , 30-40 000 rubles, 100 wagons, a lots of weapons and ammunition, horses and the commanding officers personal baggage.

When the passes has been secured the Jönköping battalion is sent back along the road towards the village of Suomenniemi in order to capture the 100 Russian jaegers who have their camp there. Of course these troops has heard the noise of the battle and has been able to prepare their retreat. They have also sent messengers to their commander in Savitaipal further south and are now waiting for instructions. Meanwhile they round up horses, sledges and drivers, and are now waiting out on the ice. When the Swedes arrive to the village it's about to get dark and in the poor light they are unable to figure out what they can see out there on the ice. Since no one in the battalion speak Finnish they can't question the villagers either. The commander, major Fahnhielm believe that he is facing a superior Russian force preparing for a counter offensive, so instead of attacking and possibly taking a large number of prisoners, he quickly retreats north along the road. In Kristina the poor major can report to the king, but Gustav is better informed and the Jönköping battalion is sent back to Suomenniemi, assumingly after some royal "constructive critique" on the majors way of conducting operations.

Jägerhorn explain the reason for the successful operation

Jägerhorn is, with all rights, proud over the success of his daring enterprise and in his "reflection" over the operation he mention a number of preparations he has made as commander in the St Michel sector and how these has contributed to the victory.

1. Good knowledge of the terrain where the battle is about to be fought.

2. Knowledge of the enemies deployment, their patrols and their strength.

3. Knowledge of the enemies routines, when they are most active and when they rests.

4. Knowledge about the enemies commander. Is he active, flexible, daring, careful, slow et cetera?

Then Jägerhorn discuss how a good commander should act while gathering the required information. The commander should know the local language and actively seek good relations with the local population in order to be able to sort out who are good sources and those "who usually create a horse out of a straw". A good commander should also be careful so that those who provide information is safe. Essentially, what Jägerhorn is describing is the fundamental principles of tactical intelligence, a function that Swedish officers in those days obviously didn't know much about or, perhaps even worse, didn't bother about.

The Russian counter attack and the defence at Parda-and Käräkoski (30 April)

The king is also impressed by Jägerhorns performance, so before he haste of to Borgå for the next phase in the royal war plan, he promote Jägerhorn to colonel. The king also appoint general major Armfelt as commander of a newly formed brigade in the southern Savolax. Armfelt set up his camp in Suomenniemi, where he also deploy some artillery and parts of the Värmland and Tavastehus regements. Jägerhorn is appointed by the king as, under Armfelts command, to be responsible for the forward detachment at Parda- and Kärnakoski.

The relationship between the two colonels was probably not very good, and based upon Jägerhorns text it is quite clear who of the two that Jägerhorn think is the better officer. Just a few days after that Jägerhorn has settled in Pardakoski he is called to a "conseil", probably some kind of planning conference in "Sääsjärfvj", a small village between Artsjö and Nyby. It's likely that the king here finalise the details on the up coming activities along the Kymmene front.

The Russians are concerned over their right flank and in order to drive the Swedes back across the border, they draw troops from Willmanstrand and the Wilkiala-area, along the northern section of the Kymmene river. The King take advantage of this and launch an offensive across the river. On the 29th of April he defeat a Russian force near Walkiala but the Swedes does not exploit that victory, instead the prepare for defence.

Jägerhorn arrive to Savolax on the same day that the king is victorious at Walkiala. By lunchtime he report to Armfelt and is given back the formal command of his troops. In Jägerhorns absence the command has been executed by a major Tavast and it's obvious that their relationship is frosty. On the evening Jägerhorn arrives to Pardakoski and at once he realise that the major has not performed the job in a manner that Jägerhorn like. During his absence major Tavast has moved outposts and the artillery and according to Jägerhorn they are all poorly deployed. What's even worse, Jägerhorns favourite subject, intelligence, has been completely ignored. There is no knowledge about the Russians, their deployment, activities, strengths, no one knows anything. It is likely that Jägerhorn know that a Russian force has been withdrawn from Walkiala and is likely to march towards Pardakoski, so in the middle of the night Jägerhorn issue a number of orders that has to be executed at once. He strengthen the outposts, the artillery that Tavast has moved is to be moved back to where Jägerhorn wants it, and finally, three particularly reliable officers are sent out on the ices in sledges in order to locate any advancing Russian columns.  Almost immediately they can report about extensive Russian activities out on the lakes.

At the daybreak on the 30th of April the Swedes can see Russian troops lined up at three different places. Jägerhorn estimates their total strength to something like 6-7 000 men, and for once he also provide a fairly detailed list of the composition of the opposing force.

The first column (more then 2000 men) is led by General Major Baijkof. He commands 800 Garde Jaegers, 800 Musketeers, 200 Grenadiers, 2 companies out of the Brebasniskj garde, an unknown number of Kalmucks and Kazaks, one 12-pounder gun, four 8-pounders and one howitzer. This column was advancing from the east across the ice and was heading straight towards Pardakoski.

The second column (more then 3000 men) was led by General Igelström who also was in charge of the entire operation. To his assistance he had general Seijkell and the prince of Anhalt. The column held the Galetskoi regiment, one battalion Lifegrenadiers and an unknown number of howizers and cannons. This column advanced along the road and formed a line on the eastern side of the lake south of Kärnäkoski.

To counter this Jägerhorn had approximately 1400 men. Two small battalions of the Närke-Värmland regiment, supported by two 3-pounder cannons was lined up on the ridge at Pardakoski to face the first Russian column.

South of the Kärnäkoski bridge the river forms a lake. Here the ice was thick and this was also where Jägerhorn assume that the Russians would make their major assault. In the forest, south of the bridge and just opposite to the Russians, major von Vegesack commanding one cannon and most of the men from the Dalarnas- and Helsinge vargering is deployed. Vegesack is also in charge of a 120 men strong detachment of the Närke-Värmland regiment defending the bridge.

All there is left as reserve is the battalion from the Jönköping regiment commanded by major Major Fahnhielm. They had been deployed in "Kuifvasari" north to Pardakoski, but as soon the Russians are spotted, Fahnhielm is ordered to join Jägerhorn in Pardakoski. When they arrive they are deployed on small hill behind von Vegesack in order to observe the third column. (According to J Mankell there is also a battalion from the Savolax regiment arriving as reinforcements but Jägerhorn does not mention them in his text.)

The attacks by the first column: As soon as the Russian column step out on the ice, the infantry is drawn up in a battle line. The cavalry deploy on the flanks and the artillery is positioned in the gaps in the infantry line. In the middle of the ice clad lake is a small island named Kotkasari and that island prevents the Russian line to advance in proper order, so instead the Russian side start to drag some artillery up on a small hill on the island. Meanwhile the Swedish artillery starts to ponder on the part of the Russian line that is visible, thus manages to inflict some casualties. Once the Russian artillery is deployed the part of the Russian line that is cleared by the island advances on Pardakoski but the defenders can beat them back with their fire and "most of them was left laying on the ice". The Russian artillery was still firing and when Captain Ribbing, the commander of one of the two Swedish battalions is killed the Swedes nerves crack and they hastily retreats back towards the village of Pardakoski. 

Jägerhorn is nearby and see what's happening. He gives a short speech to the troops and then he lead them, reinforced with an other cannon, back to their former positions. On the Russian side they have seen the Swedes routing and they have launched an other attack. However the Swedes is back in their positions just in time to once again repel them. Once again the Russian side suffers extensive losses, this time including their chief in command, General major Baijkof who is mortally wounded. The offensive power of the first Russian column was hereby broken.

The attacks by the second column: At the same time the first Russian column is trying to advance on Pardakoski, the second column started their offensive. Initially they use their bigger artillery on the Swedish posting by the bridge, but when they realise the the Swedes on the other side is to well protected their interest is turned on von Vegesacks troops on the other side of the lake instead. The first Russian attack is beaten back but the second try forces the Swedish line back and their cannon falls in the hand of the advancing Russians.   

Jägerhorn can hear the intensive battle and understand that the situation is desperate and he sends reinforcements to the scene (the Jönköping battalion according to J Mankell). These fresh troops arrives just as von Vegesack has been pushed back but as his shaken line see the new arrivals von Vegesack can lead a successful counter attack and recapture the cannon. The Russian side regroup and bring up more troops for a third attack but when the prince of Anhalt and his aide d' camp are both killed the Russians gives up and returns to Savitaipal.

For some reason, a Russian battery with two cannons has been left by the Kärnäkoski bridge. As the Russian main force starts to retreat,  the Swedish posting takes the opportunity to make a quick raid across the bridge, thus capturing the cannons and their crew..

The third column: While the other two columns was engaging the Swedes, the third column remained passive. They formed a battle lie and sent their artillery up front in order to bombard the Swedes up on the hill (Jönköpings battalion according to Jägerhorn while J Mankell claim that there was also a battalion of the Savolax regiment on that hill). The fire had no effect and as the fighting's on the other scenes stopped the Swedes prepared to deal with Berkmans column. But before the Swedes was able to start any attack, General Berckman retreated in good order.

The Russian losses was according to Jägerhorn considerable. The Swedish troops recover the bodies of 2 officers, 12 NCO's and 116 soldiers and a lot more Russians are said to have been buried by their own during the retreat . The Swedish side manages to take 95 prisoners, 6 cannons and a large amount of muskets and other equipment left behind. The losses on the Swedish side was also notable. 18 men was lost as prisoners, 2 officers, 1 NCO and 30 men died while 6 officers, 4 NCO's and 163 men was wounded.

According to Jägerhorn, the battle raged for 6-7 hours but it takes general major Armfelt yet an other hour to show up with an extra battalion of the Närke-Värmland regiment.

Armfelt is also bringing an order for Jägerhorn to report to the King so Jägerhorn leave at once, which mean that he doesn't have the time to write a proper battle report. Instead the official report is written by Major Tavast, the temporary commander whose dispositions that Jägerhorn less then a day ago had dismissed. In his diary, Jägerhorn is upset over what he regard as Tavasts attempt to take the whole credit for the victory, especially since Jägerhorn claim that he didn't see the major until the end of the battle.

The review of the battle written by Julius Mankell match Jägerhorns but it differ in details. According to Jägerhorn, the attack of the first and second Russian column was executed simultaneously, according to Mankell the first column didn't start their attacks until the second was already beaten. Mankell asses the Russian force on the scene to have been smaller then what Jägerhorn writes. Mankell give the figure 4-5 000 men. Finally, Mankell note that one battalion of the Savolax regiment was on the scene, a fact not mentioned by Jägerhorn. It is likely that Jägerhorn has "spiced up" the engagement in order to strengthen his own reputation as a commander but regardless of that, there is no doubt that  the troops on the scene performed extremely well. However, why Jägerhorn has forgotten to mention a battalion of his own regiment is a mystery to me.

The Russian attack on Pirtimäki (5 may)

In the village were about "500 serviceable men and several ill" as Jägerhorn write. In the neighbourhood was also 5 postings containing roughly 250 men. Due to the effects of the Swedish attack on Parda- and Kärnäkoski some of the Russian troops in Pumala  was ordered to  Savitalal to participate in the counter attack but soon fresh troops fill the gap and more is expected.

The Swedes realise that if they ever want to retake Pumala it's now or never. The Commander of the Savolax brigade, general major von Stedink arrive on the scene on the 4th of may with the intention to perform an armed reconnaissance against Pumala. To gain maximum power he orders all the postings in the area to be withdrawn and that all troops should gather early next morning on the road south of Pirtimäki.        

However the Russians must have had a similar idea and they was just a little faster then the Swedes. By midnight the Swedish jaeger patrols and the forward posting deployed along the road between Pumala and Pirtimäki is attacked and thrown back towards Pirtimäki. The Russian force advance so fast that the Swedish force in Pirtimäki have just formed their lines when they comes under Russian fire. One Russian detachment advance along a ridge and for a moment they threaten to flank out the Swedish right wing. At the same time an other Russian detachment gain control over the Southern part of the village and from that possition they can bring the crowded Swedish forces under effective fire from their muskets.

The russians have managed to set the southern village on fire and this helps the Swedes and finally  Captain Kihlström and a detachment of the Tavastehus regiment can drive the Russians out of the southern part of village (A on the map below). The captain and his men are then sent to the threaten right flank where they join major Utfall (=sally forth!) and 60 men of the Älvsborgs regiment. The two teams engage the Russians on the ridge (D) with their bayonets and after four attacks the Russians finally retreats. The Swedes isn't strong enough to finish them off and the retreating Russians can again form their line in a small valley nearby.

By now the Swedish detachments that has been posted all over the area starts to show up. Ensign Bosin and 20 men of the Tavastehus regiment (B) shows up in the rear of the Russian right flank and engage with their bayonets. Te confusion is exploited by the Savolax troops that is still defending the village. Supported by one cannon they can finally clear the village of intruders (C). When Captain Lode and an additional 107 men from the Savolax regiment arrives (E) the Russian side turns back home towards Pumala.

The retreat is no headless run, instead the Russians manages to maintain  full combat contact with the advancing Swedes and on a small ridge approximately 2-3 kilometres south of Pirtimäki their ariere garde and a few cannons takes up the defence (F). Under their cover the Russian force and a number of wagons can safely reach Pumala. Major Grönvall and 150 men of the Björneborgs regiment is sent to encircle the Russian ariere garde but the defenders manages to retreat yet another couple of kilometres where they can take up a much stronger position. By now the Swedish side is running low on ammunition and cancel all further activities.

Back in Pirtimäki the 5 hour long battle is summed up. The Swedish side had lost 3 officers, 1 NCO and 18 men as dead. They also counted  4 officers, and 98 men as wounded. The Swedish side buried the remains of 1 Russian officer 25 soldiers and took 1 officer and about 30 men as prisoners, most of them severely wounded. Jägerhorn estimate that the Russian losses was considerable higher than this as large number of muskets and dead horses was left behind on the battle field.

In his "reflection" over the engagement Jägerhorn is very critical on how the commanding officer in Pirtimäki Lieutenant colonel Gripenberg had executed his mission. Jägerhorn accuses him, straight forward, to have chosen Pirtimäki as camp more for the comfort then for it's suitability as a defensive position. Since Jägerhorn was de facto the commander of the Pumala compagnie less the two years earlier one can assume that he knows the terrain and knows what he is talking about. He also accuses Gripenberg of being too passive. According to Jägerhorn he could have done much more in order to recapture Pumala, or at least maintained a higher level of readiness so that the Russians could not had been able to succeed with their surprise attack.

Although the Swedish side managed to repel the attack, Jägerhorn consider it as a Russian victory. Their intension was not likely to capture terrain but to weaken the Swedes, thus securing their own possession of Pumala. Since no further Swedish actions was executed against Pumala for the remainder of the war I do agree with him. The Russian side could undisrupted use the vital water way between Willmanstrand and Nyslott.

The battle at the Keltis barracks (19-20 may)

On the 29th of April Gustav III lead a minor offensive towards Walkiala to exploit the vacuum left by the troops that has been sent towards Kärnäkoski. The Russian reply is rapid but just as most other reactions during this war it's not sent directly on the intruders. Instead the counter attack is directed towards a weak spot nearby on order to threaten the supply routs for initial intruding force, thus forcing them to retreat.

On the 1st of may Russian batteries start to bombard Swedish positions at Anjala and Hirvenkoski. The bombardment goes on for four days but surprisingly, the Swedish command makes no preparations to counter any Russian attempts to cross the river. On the night to the 5th of may a Russian party crosses the river in boats near Anjala and can easily secure the bridge. Another unit perform the same kind of operation at Hirvenkoski. Once the invasion is reported the few Swedish troops in the area are concentrated to Wilikala. Further north the king and his detachment retreat to the Swedish side of the river again. On the 6th of may tree battles are fought.

At Hirvenkoski the Swedish forces pushes the Russians back across the river but at Korhois the Swedes are beaten back towards Wilikala and at Jokkila the Swedes are forced to retreat towards Keltis. By now the entire length of the river is secured by the Russians and it's safe for more troops to cross the river and on the 9th of may a reinforced Russian detachment can drive the Swedes away from Keltis. For the first time of the war a Russian force threaten to advance along the road leading towards Tavastehus via Nyby. The Swedish reserve commanded by General von Pauli has to be moved from Elimä to Nyby. Apparently the Russian side has achieved their goals, so instead of pushing deeper into Swedish territory they start to dig in to defend what they have gained.

After the battle at Parda- and Kärnäkoski Jägerhorn was ordered to report to the king. On the 5th and 6th of may he sees Gustav in Borgå. He is now appointed as "General aide d' camp" (I don't know if this is the proper translation) and is sent to general von Pauli with the instructions to as soon as possible drive the intruders back across the river. In order to get a picture of what he is up against Jägerhorn and a detachment of jaegers performs reconnaissance along a small road towards Värälä. He finds that the location is well defended and holds "numerous of troops and fortifications". Instead he travels to the Swedish force along the Nyby road. He find them camping in Ninimäki, in a "nasty" location. The force is camping in a small valley surrounded by  undefended heights, and what's worse, no knowledge of what the Russians are up to.

To gather some information of the Russians in the area Jägerhorn manages to get the whole detachment out on a reconnaissance expedition towards Keltis. On the 12th of may they advance past Keltis and reaches Nappa where they encounter a larger Russian force. The y judge that the Russians are too strong to engage at the moment, beside this Swedish reinforcements are expected any day so there is no hurry. The Swedes pulls back but Jägerhorn makes sure that they now has stronger postings guarding the camp.

On the 17th the Russians tries to do what Jägerhorn did at less then a week earlier at Nappa, but the strong postings manages to fend of all Russians. The week in Ninimäki is used by the Swedes to train on a new tactical concept. As most of their battalions had been reduced to half, or in some cases to one third of their original strength, they foresee a serious problem in an up coming engagement as their line will be unable to present the required length. An other problem is that the traditional three-rank line is difficult to manoeuvre in the forested terrain that they are to fight in. The solution to these problems is the more loose order of a two rank line. Jägerhorn does not mention if this is his idea from Savolax or if there is anyone else in the camp that brings it up.

On the 19th of may the Swedes moves out to engage their opponent. On the march is a total of 9n small infantry battalions, including some "green dragoons", a nick-name for the Bohus dragoon regiment. In all there is 2 000 Swedes on the march, not more then 200 men per battalion. Will the two-rank tactics be enough to compensate the lack of manpower?

The plan is that general Paulis attack on Keltis is to be coordinated with an attack by general von Platen towards Korhois and Anjala.

As the Swedish force is heading east, a Russian force of nearly 3 000 men are carefully moving west. When they reach a ridge near Keltis they prepare for defence, probably expecting a Swedish initiative. 

As soon as the Swedish force shows up the Russian artillery starts firing. One Battalion from the Östgöta regiment is sent down through the forest in order to take out the Russian artillery, while the rest of the force engage the Russians on the ridge. The new two-rank tactics pays of. Not only does the Swedes manage to present a front of equal length as the Russians, eventually they even manages outflank the defenders! The infantry engagement rolls back and forth. Jägerhorn writes that the both side was locked into a stalemate for nearly 8 hours. The Swedes had to bring forward two extra rations of ammunition to the line, which mean that each man fired about 72 rounds.  On Jägerhorns recommendation the Swedish reserve, a battalion from the Kronobergs regiment is sent forward to support the Östgöta battalion that is trying to reach the Russian artillery. Finally a decisive push is made but the Russians can see what's coming so when the two Swedish battalions reaches the battery the cannons are all ready withdrawn. Once the battery is in Swedish hands the Russian infantry starts to pull back. At first its slow and in fairly good order but soon, one by one the Russian units starts to rout and soon the chase on. The Swedes continue to advance and by the end of the day the bulk of the invaders has retreated back across the river.

The long engagement caused a lot of damage on both side. The Swedish losses was 4 officers and 40 men as dead and another 60 as wounded. Jägerhorn claim that the Swedish troops recovered and buried the remains of 200 dead Russians.

In his "reflecion" over the engagement Jägerhorn hails the two-rank tactics. It had proven to be most useful and had shown all the good effects that they had expected. He also points out the principle to hit the enemy's weakest spot, in this case their left flank.

The expedition towards Savitaipal (4 june)

Since the Russian offensive on Parda- and Kärnäkoski and the one across the Kymmene river had been beaten back, it was time for the Swedish side to plan for their next move. Down by the coast the Swedish archipelago fleet had beaten its Russian counterpart in an engagement near Fredrikshamn, and as far as the Swedish command in Finland knew, the King was just about to send his troops ashore near St Petersburg to finish of the war. (What they did not know was that he and the entire navy was on their way of getting locked into the archipelago near Viborg and instead was close to being forced to surrender.) To gain as much land as possible before the expected peace conference the few remaining troops in Finland are about to spend their last amount of energy. The costal division has advanced on Fredrikshamn but are halted at Kymmenegård (Kotka), General Pauli and his force was expected to cross the river and head for Davidstad and then towards Willmanstrand. Finally, general major Armfelt was planning to conquer Savitapal and then join forces  with Pauli in the final push on Willmanstrand. To what extent this plan was known and approved by the king is not clear, but General Pauli's force and colonel Jägerhorn is not involved in any of the event. Still, Jägerhorn describe in detail Armfelts expedition towards Savitaipal. Why? I don't know, but since many of the persons that he had previously been so critical about is participating, my personal theory is that Jägerhorn is writing both for his students to learn by their mistakes but also to prove that these commanders are plain incompetent .

Major Debordieu with two small boats armed with cannons and manned by sick or wounded troops are to show up at 11 o clock on the lake north of Savitaipal. Their job is to give the Russians the impression that the Swedes are about to make an amphibious attack on their camp.

Armfelt will in person lead the main column. Their avant-garde is formed by the Dalarnas vargering. They are in order followed by one battalion of the Jönköping regiment and the life battalion of the Närke-Värmland regiment. Armfelts column uses the main road and are about to attack Savitaipal at 12 o clock.

At the same time Armfelts column arrive and they starts to drive back the russian postings along the road (4). Initially it works according to the plan. When Armfelt reaches the section where the road follows the shore things stars to go wrong (5).

The plan is based on the assumption that the three columns can attack the village more or less simultaneously (2,3 and 6) but instead of waiting for the others Armfelt tries to advance alone. He also decide to use the fastest way, along the road By doing this his entire force has to advance nearly 700 meters under the gun fire from the Russian side before they reach the southern end of the lake. Once there the terrain and the heavy Russian fire makes it more or less impossible to form a proper line. Meanwhile more and more troops keeps pouring in from behind. As several officers, including Armfelt, is hit the troops rout and starts to run. At the point where the first Russian post was found (4)  the run can be halted and the units can be reorganized again. In this position they wait for for any sign of engagement from Tavast or Gripenberg. After 2 hours they retreat to Kärnäkoski.

So, what happened to the other two columns?

Tavast claim that the guide they had engaged led them in the wrong direction, and that the battle was already over when they finally arrived to Savitaipal.

Gripenberg claims that Russian jaegers blocked his way and made it impossible to advance and attack.

Both Jägerhorn and Mankell are very critical in their review of the expedition. Jägerhorn accepts the plan as such. he review it as a bit too complex but quite possible to execute. But his critique against the commanders of the three columns are devastating.

Armfelt should have waited for the others before he attacked. He is also blamed for deliberately taking too much losses for no gain as he choose to advance along the road near the lake. Jägerhorns idea is to deploy artillery on the ridge to engage the Russians and meanwhile have the infantry to advance through the terrain, covered by the ridge.

Tavast, who obviously has managed to generate honour enough from the battle of Kärnäkoski to get promoted, is also heavily criticised. Järerhorn claim that the locals all regards the Russians as the enemy, thus Tavasts explanation of being misled by the local guide is just rubbish.

Finally, the heaviest critique is aimed towards Gripenberg who Jägerhorn more or less openly calls incompetent and a coward. Jägerhorn see no reason on how a "hand full" of jaegers could stop the force that Gripenberg had. To strengthen his argument, Jägerhorn claim that Gripenberg earlier in the war had shown weakness, slowness and "temidité". The fact that some of the officers and NCO's with the Helsinge vargering, who had acted as avant garde, had been wounded during the engagement, but none of their comrades from the Tavastehus regiment had been hit show that Gripenberg have not even tried to fight his way through.

In principles, Mankell share Jägerhorns critique of the commanding officers, but he also disapprove of the entire plan. The Swedish tactics in Savolax tended to be to split an attacking force on three columns. The general idea behind this was to confuse the defenders and to cut of their communications with their rear area. Mankell approve of the theory. If everything goes as planned it's often successful but once the columns are on the march there are little or no chance to adjust the plan to new facts. There are just too much that can go wrong!

I agree with Mankell. 100 or maybe 150 years later, when telephones and radios were available for coordination of the subunits, the tactical idea proved very efficient on many battle fields. However, neither Jägerhorn, nor Mankell were allowed to live to see this.       

The price of this failure was tremendous. 6 officers, 4 NCO's, 87 soldiers 3 drivers and 40 horses was died on the Swedish side. 21 officers, including general major Armfelt, 7 NCO's and 207 men was wounded. As they retreated the Swedes had to leave 3 cannons behind. According to the calculations made by J Mankell one third of all men that participated in Armfelts column was either killed or wounded! I am quite sure that there was some exchange of harsh words among the men as thy returned to their former camp.

Go back to the campaign of 1788

Go back to the campaign of 1789